Abstract
Introduction
In 2008, practices that were allegedly adopted by auction house proprietor, Rod Menzies, to promote his auction business' best interests were the subject of an investigative report published in Australian Financial Review (AFR) by journalist Pamela Williams, and a Four Corners program, Art for Art's Sake, which was screened on the ABC. 3 It was alleged that these practices had the potential to distort the sales figures at Menzies' auction houses and stimulate prices for particular artists and specific artworks, while artificially boosting overall market confidence in particular market sectors.
Placed under scrutiny were a number of practices purportedly undertaken by Menzies and his auction businesses. It was alleged that Menzies, who is a major art collector in his own right, had not disclosed when he was selling artworks in which he had a financial interest through one of his auction houses. This is important information for a buyer as it signals where an auction house might have a vested interest in promoting one artwork over another. In the AFR report, Williams also reported instances where Menzies had been both the seller and buyer of high-profile artworks, such as Arthur Boyd's Death of a Husband; essentially, it was alleged that he had offered the artwork for due to the anonymous reviewer who offered an invaluable and constructive critique of this paper. I also owe a sincere and warm debt of gratitude to Professor Neil De Marchi of Duke University, who has generously shared his insights about the economics of the art market with me and offered detailed and rigorous criticism that has helped shape my thinking about economic theory and how it applies to the art market. John Furphy of the Australian Art Sales Digest also generously offered me publicly inaccessible data about the Australian art auction market that I used to construct Figure 1 in this paper. 3 For the original documents: P. Williams, 'Exposed: How artful Menzies pulls auction house strings ' (2008) , in The Australian Financial Review, 26 June, 1, 60-1. Australian Broadcasting Commission, 'Art for Art's Sake ' (2008) , Four Corners. For subsequent media coverage: G. Coslovich, 'Art auctioneer faces inquiry ' (2008a) , in The Age, 6 September, 9; G. Coslovich, 'Doubts stay as Menzies alters fine print ' (2008b) , in The Age, 12 August, 14; P. Coster, 'Sparring with Rod Menzies', (2008b) , in Herald Sun, 22 May; P. Coster, 'Art market ethics ' (2008a) , in Herald Sun, 3 July; C. Perkin, 'Art auction row goes to ACCC', (2008a) in The Australian, 30 July; C. Perkin, 'Menzies' plan of auction ', (2008b) , in The Weekend Australian, 30 August, 28; P. Williams, 'Art auction rivals hammer for transparency ' (2008a) , in Australian Financial Review, 11 August, 68; M. Wilson-Anastasios, 'There's an art to forcing up auction prices ' (2008) , in The Age, 1 August, 15.
guaranteed price is not reached at auction, the auction house is obliged to pay the seller the guarantee, and the artwork becomes the property of the auction house itself. This practice is not uncommon in the international art auction market, but it caused concern here when it was alleged by Williams in AFR that Menzies himself, sometimes in partnership with other agents, was offering MAB clients guarantees. Further, although it was specified in the terms and conditions in Menzies' catalogues that a symbol would be used in the catalogue description to signify when an artwork was being sold subject to a guarantee, Williams found examples where a guarantee had been offered, but the symbol was not printed in the catalogue entry. For a potential bidder, it is important to know when a guarantee has been offered because it signals that the auction house has a very strong vested interest in ensuring that the artwork reaches a set minimum price. Although that could also be said for reserve prices -if the reserve price is not met, the artwork will not sell and the auction house will not receive any commission -in the case of a guarantee the impetus to sell is far greater because the auction house will potentially be liable for the entire cost of the work of art. Further, it was claimed that when MAB was compelled to pay a client the agreed-upon minimum price, that price entered the auction record and MAB sales reports as 'sold', even though, to all intents and purposes, the artwork had failed to sell.
The question of provenance, which is an artwork's ownership history, as presented in MAB auction catalogues was also aired as a matter of concern. In the auction market, buyers look for works that An important question arising from the ensuing public debate is how the techniques used by auction houses including MAB to secure market share and maximize earnings might manifest in the auction record. Although it has not been addressed in a systematic manner elsewhere, the first step in potential impact of the techniques employed by auction houses in Australia and internationally to increase their market share, the auction system requires that genuine and unrestricted competition between multiple bidders is responsible for generating prices. If activities within the marketplace undermine or restrict competition, then the prices that emanate from the system will not reflect genuine levels of demand. These prices then enter the auction record and become precedents for future prices. This is relevant to the question at hand because, as I will show, buyers in the art market tend to accept price as an indicator of quality, and their behaviour at auction reflects that acceptance.
Buyer responsiveness to auction prices and auction house activities
At auction, buyers tend to believe that prices are validated by the actions of competing bidders. In the art auction market, for buyers who are uncertain of their own ability to discern 'good' art from 'bad' art, the apparently impartial affirmation provided by the competitive process of price-setting at auction is taken as an indicator of quality. 'Signalling', as described by Nobel laureates Michael Spence, George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz, is a general economic theory that proposes that price is an important factor for consumers in a marketplace where quality is difficult to determine and there is an asymmetrical distribution of information amongst market participants.
18
Marketing theory also shows that price becomes the principal indicator of quality for buyers when it is difficult for anyone other than an expert to determine which product is 'better'. Describing the market for consumer goods such as skin-care products, Neil Dorward observes: 'when consumers have very little information on the product, they tend to regard price as an index of quality.' 19 As described by Stiglitz, under these conditions: 'price serves a function in addition to that usually ascribed to it in economic theory: it conveys information and affects behaviour.'
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Buyers at auction tend to accept auction house assessments of value, and prices generated by the auction system, because they have faith in the expertise and authority of the people who set the prices. In a market where impartial and reliable information about the product being sold is difficult for consumers to obtain, expert opinion carries great weight with buyers. Psychologists Solomon Asch, Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard have documented the power wielded by authority figures over human decision-making processes. 21 This holds for investor behaviour in the stock market where, through accumulated experiences acquired by observing outcomes when they ignore expert opinion, economist Robert Shiller has found that people have 'learned that when experts tell them something is all right, it probably is, even if it does not seem so.' 22 They therefore tend to believe expert opinion even where it contradicts their own assessments or common sense. In the art auction market, economists Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy have also found a correlation between auction house authority and the establishment of prices: 'the auction institution itself, with Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003, p.776. This is what we would expect if art buyers find it difficult to obtain useful information to allow them to differentiate between a 'good' buy and a 'bad' buy. Positive feedback loops of this type occur in response to price increases, and this bolsters buyer confidence. Positive feedback loops accelerate change, whereas negative loops retard development.
Some sociologists ascribe the inherent dynamism of social systems to the existence of feedback loops. In terms of Australian auction house practices, this calls into question the issue of regulation; the only way of neutralising instability in a financial market is to ensure that social institutions and regulations counterbalance the effect of positive feedback loops. 25 The lack of regulation in the Australian auction market means that the effect of these loops operate unchecked. This can manifest as price volatility, and volatility can undermine the sustainability of a market that relies upon maintaining buyer confidence.
Dominance of the 'top-tier auction houses'
Evidence strongly suggests that the Australian auction system is segmented between the businesses that dominate the 'top-end' of the market, and other auction houses. This segmentation is apparent 24 Shiller, above n 12, 44. 25 Apparently random and chaotic evolution within natural systems is explained by biologists through reference to feedback loops. T. Baumgartner, T. R. Burns & P. Deville, The shaping of socio-economic systems (1986), 10. in the auction record, and can be inferred both from the total value of sales they generate, and divergent prices for individual artworks. Neil De Marchi has documented a similar lack of homogeneity between top-tier and lower level auction sales in his important study of the paintings market in seventeenth-century London. 26 This market was, according to De Marchi, 'segmented by quality and audience, and often by location of sale.'
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Aggregate figures show that market growth during the boom that commenced in the late 1990s was not spread across the entire Australian market, but was restricted to its top-end. Figures 1 and 2 show the relative frequency of top-tier and lower level sales and the total revenue generated by those sales. Figure 1 shows that while the relative number of auctions staged at the three auction houses that dominated the market between 1999 and 2006, Sotheby's, Deutscher-Menzies and
Christie's, remained relatively steady during the boom, the number of lower level auctions increased significantly. At the time of writing, the principal Australian art auction database, Australian Art Sales Digest (AASD), lists a total of 23 auction businesses other than the major auction houses operating in Australia.
28 Figure 2 , however shows that the total revenue generated by the major sales has grown dramatically over the same period, compared with the total value of sales made at the other auction houses, which has remained fairly constant over the survey period.
This means that although there were more auctions and, presumably, more artworks sold elsewhere in the auction system, there has been no significant increase in the amount of revenue generated outside the top-end of the market. 26 De Marchi concludes that there was a distinction between the market sector that sold large numbers of decorative, low-price artworks and the part of the market that dealt in significant artworks that appealed to a more discerning group of elite buyers. N. De Marchi, 'Auctioning paintings in late seventeenth-century London: Rules, segmentation and prices in an emergent market', in V. A. Ginsburgh (ed), If the major Australian auction houses have dominated the market during the boom and been responsible for generating the significant growth that has occurred at the top of the market, and if many buyers look to the prices established at auction when deciding which art to buy, and what price to pay, it means that a great deal of power has resided in the hands of the people managing the top-end auction houses. The way these businesses are managed and the practices they use to conduct sales are therefore of great importance to the market and industry as a whole. In the Australian market segmentation between the top-tier and lower level auction houses is not always based on quality. Price differentiation is not simply attributable to the likelihood that the 'best' artworks will invariably go to the major auctions. There can be a marked difference between prices for identical, or very similar, artworks sold at the top-tier and the lower level auction houses.
The top-tier auction houses can generate higher prices as a matter of course, and not just because they secure the 'best', and so most valuable, artworks to sell. This is tacitly acknowledged within the industry. Informal discussions with many dealers during the course of my research confirmed that it is possible to make a livelihood simply by buying artworks at the lower-level auction houses, and reselling them a short time later at one of the major auctions. This not surprising; the larger auction houses are able to access a far larger audience through effective marketing and a greater resource base. More bidders will presumably result in higher levels of demand, enhanced competition, and higher prices. Regardless of the cause, this suggests that simply by selecting an artist or an artwork to include in a major sale, the dominant auction houses are able to generate higher prices for particular artists and even specific artworks.
Repeat sales of prints
In the Australian auction system, it is common for identical prints to sell for different prices within a short period of time at different auction houses. For example, Figure 3 , which compares contemporaneous sales of the same prints by Charles Blackman at various auction houses, shows a part of the 'Menzies Art Brands' group, means that it is difficult to classify Lawson-Menzies strictly as a top-tier or an 'other' auction house.
have a marked effect on its price, this is not the case in these instances, where the prints were all in excellent condition. This suggests that prices for identical artworks can be higher at the major sales as a matter of course.
artist artwork sale details price

Charles Blackman
Alice in the garden, etching, 19 x 14.5 cm.
• Figures also show that Boyd's average price per work was higher at the major auction houses than the lower level auctions. Figure 5 shows that Leonard Joel sold more of Boyd's work by volume than the top three auction houses but the average price per artwork was significantly lower. The three other lower level auction houses that sold significant numbers of Boyd's paintings, Archers, Australian Art Auctions, and Lawson's, generated similar prices to Leonard Joel. The DeutscherMenzies average price was four and a half times greater than the Leonard Joel average. It is perhaps not surprising that Deutscher-Menzies' prices were higher given that it was established in 1998 and so the overall average was not reduced by Boyd's earlier, lower prices. These figures suggest that although buyers could have acquired Boyd's work for lower prices at the lower-level auction houses, they were willing to pay more at the major auction houses. It is possible that they assumed that the work at the top-tier auction houses was 'better', so they were willing to pay more for it. Consequently, when most of the secondary trade in Boyd's work moved to the major auctions, his auction prices jumped suddenly and dramatically.
Why would buyers be so responsive to the endorsement of a major auction house? It is possible that the top-tier auction houses perform a 'filtration' function for many buyers in the market. The artworks that make it into the major sales are accepted as superior to the works on offer at the lower level auctions without question. If buyers lack confidence in their own ability to make judgements about quality, they may rely upon the dominant auction houses to do this on their behalf. In this sense, the major auction houses could be described as the embodiment of the juste milieu and performing a function as the new Salon, just as impressionist painter Auguste Renoir described the 19 th century French Salon:
I will try to explain why I send my paintings to the Salon. There are fifteen art lovers in
Paris capable of appreciating a painter without the Salon. There are 80,000 who wouldn't buy a thing from a painter not exhibiting at the Salon. Since the 1970s, only 13% of Coleman's work has sold at the top-tier auction houses. Figure 8 , which distinguishes between Rapotec's sales at the different auction houses, shows that his average auction prices were also consistently higher at the major auctions. 12 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 number of paintings .
Second-and third-tier auction houses top-tier auction houses 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 average value .
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Artists and auction houses
The above findings suggest that an artist's auction prices are more likely to increase when his or her work begins to appear regularly at one of the major Australian auction houses, and that the top-tier auction houses are more likely to attract higher prices for artworks as a matter of course. In some other instances, it seems that an association between particular artists and specific major auction houses may have contributed to the rise of an artist's auction prices.
Deutscher-Menzies
Prior to establishing Deutscher-Menzies with his then business partner, Rod Menzies, Chris
Deutscher was an art dealer who represented several artists whose auction prices grew significantly during the boom including Peter Booth, Tim Storrier, Tim Maguire and John Brack. Figure 9 shows that Deutscher-Menzies dominated the market in these artists' work after its establishment in 1998.
It is likely that Deutscher had an advantage over his competitors through his connections with the collectors who had acquired work through his gallery and with the artists and their families.
Deutscher-Menzies' dominance of Brack's market is particularly notable. Brack had a strong auction record prior to Deutscher-Menzies' establishment; Christie's and Sotheby's have sold Brack's work since the 1970s and might otherwise be expected to have generated more sales. Christie's used specific parameters to define the artists considered suitable for inclusion in its contemporary sales:
…aged between 35 and 50 years who are addressing contemporary issues about the world in which we live through minimalist, postmodern and conceptual art…. Artists who are creating beautifully made art right now… they look at the world, life, religion, sex with contemporary ideas.
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Annette Larkin was enthusiastic in her support of this new generation of artists. 42 She spoke of the new buyers Christie's had recruited, saying that the 'young, IT savvy, moneyed clientele' had entered the market as 'a direct result of Christie's specifically targeting the contemporary market.'
Christie's was able to determine which contemporary artists were presented to these new buyers at its auctions, and the company appeared to publicise particular artists over others; this also seemed to coincide with price increases for those artists. drawing considerable market attention at the time, so it is not surprising to find them mentioned in publicity material. The other three artists were Angela Brennan, Susan Norrie, and Imants Tillers.
All three of these artists had modest auction profiles prior to the establishment of Christie's
Contemporary. But Figure 11 shows 
Conclusion
In 2000, prominent Australian dealer, William Nuttall of Niagara Galleries, observed that:
Auction houses are extremely influential…. you get all these uneducated people running in, prepared to pay any amount of money for art which they have been told is the hottest thing at the moment. They don't really know what they are doing, but they have plenty of money to throw around. It's a bit like the stock market.
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Elsewhere, Nuttall said that: 'the auction houses have responded to the demand our gallery has helped to create…. I never want an auction house to become an arbiter of taste.' 49 But evidence presented in this paper suggests that auction houses do play a role in the formation of prices and, to an extent, can shape buyer preference. It seems that buyers depend on the major auction houses for information that helps them make choices and to indicate an artwork's likely value. An artwork sold at a top-tier auction house is more likely to sell for a higher price than an identical, or very similar, piece sold at a lower level auction house. It also seems that if an artist attracts the endorsement of a major auction house, signified by inclusion in its sales, his or her prices are likely to rise.
Given buyers' dependence upon signals transmitted from the auction system, it is important to ensure that the prices that are established at the major auction houses are generated through genuine competition and that the auction record reflects true levels of demand. If the auction record does not reflect genuine levels of demand, this can cause price volatility and so undermine buyer confidence in the market. To ensure this does not occur in the future, it seems that there is a strong argument in favour of establishing industry regulation to restrict behaviour of this type and to protect buyers' best interests. Under current conditions, an auction house is only bound to promote the seller's and its own best interest. Its only obligation to the buyer is to avoid misrepresentation, for example not knowingly selling a forgery or stolen goods. The prices generated through the auction system are not necessarily objective or reflect real competition, still less the way these prices are reported. As would be expected, auction houses will influence outcomes in their own favour wherever possible.
In the absence of regulation, an auction house will make use of all available opportunities to maximize revenue generation. But this becomes problematic when a lack of regulation accommodates behaviour that makes it difficult for buyers to obtain the information they require to make an informed and sensible judgment about price in a marketplace where competition is imagined to be the principle price determinant. If a buyer is mindful of an artwork's investment potential, which research has shown most buyers are to varying degrees, then it is important for that buyer to be able to ascertain where forces may be distorting prices, and so render those prices unsustainable.
In terms of market sustainability, if the institutions and agents that dominate the centre of an economic system can exploit a lack of regulation to shift the already inequitable distribution of resources further in their own favour, the agglomerative pull of resources towards the biggest agents reduces the development capabilities of the smaller auction businesses and agents on the periphery of the system. This can undermine the long-term diversity of the auction system and encourage the emergence of monopolies as larger businesses absorb smaller auction houses and so reduce buyers'
and sellers' choice. This occurred in Australia during the most recent market boom when international auction house, Bonhams, acquired some of Australia's oldest and largest local auction businesses in three capital cities: Goodman's in Sydney, Leonard Joel in Melbourne, and Bruce's in Adelaide. Only regulation can ensure that the auction houses that dominate the system do not accelerate the process of redundancy that already exists by placing further pressure on smaller businesses.
Ironically, in light of the global financial crisis, the greatest pressure is likely to come to bear on the top end of the market. The boom that commenced in the late 1990s created a seller's market. The major auction houses' biggest problem was securing enough high-end stock to satisfy buyers' demand. Most of the practices discussed in this article were tactics initiated by auction houses as incentives for sellers to convince them to consign works for sale, and to attract buyers' attention.
Now that the discretionary funds that fuelled the boom have largely dried up, the challenge facing auction houses is more likely to be finding buyers. Given the current financial climate, it seems unlikely that auction houses will be offering sellers guarantees; in New York, Christie's is being sued by a collector who alleges that the auction house has refused to comply with the terms of a guarantee negotiated in July 2008; when the collector's Francis Bacon painting, which was offered for sale with a $US40 million guarantee, failed to sell in November 2008, according to the complaint Christie's refused to pay the guarantee citing 'the changed climate of the art market'.
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Although the conditions that generated the practices discussed in this paper may have changed, with the result that they are likely to become less prevalent in the immediate future, without regulation they are likely to recur. 50 E. Larson, 'Christie's auction house sued over Francis Bacon guarantee ' (2009), in Bloomberg News, 20 March.
